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THE POSITION OF BELIEVERS AS SECOND-CLASS CITIZENS
IN SOCIALIST COUNTRIES: THE CASE OF YUGOSLAVIA

By Zdenko Roter
Zdenko Roter (Marxist) is the dean and professor of sociology at the School of
Sociology, Political Science and Journalism at University of Ljubljana, Yugoslavia.
Dr. Roter was educated at University of Ljubljana and University of Sarajevo and
wrote a number of books on church-state relations in Yugoslavia, sociologies of
religion, and studies on public opinion in Slovenia. Previous articles of his appeared
in OPREE, Vol. VIII, No. 2 (May 1 988). This paper was prepared for the Second
International Conference on ways to promote the 1 9 8 1 U.N. Declaration on the
Elimination of All Forms of Intolerance and Discrimination Based on Religion or
Belief, "Building Understanding and Respect between People of Diverse Religions or
Beliefs," Warsaw, Poland, May 1 4- 1 8 , 1 989.

There are two reasons why I am using the case of Yugosl�via in order to deal with the
theme of believers as second-class citizens. The first one is simply that I am living and
working as a scholar in that country. It is my ethical and scholarly responsibility not to
restrict the results of my many years of scholarly investigation only within the borders of my
country, regardless whether the results of that scientific investi gation are "favorable" or
"unfavorable" for my country. I consider sociology to be a critical social science, which must
be emancipated from ideological and politocratic structures regardless of possible personal
consequences. For that reason I do not accept the ideological classification into Marxist and
bourgeois sociology, according to which the former ought to be an apologist for the socialist
(Marxist) social system, because the latter, according to this classification, defends, by
definition the capitalist system.
The second reason is in my conviction that there are some key characteristics valid for
all socialist countries. Concisely these characteristics could be expressed by the term "real
socialism," which was accepted in Yugoslav sociology more or less as a key analytical concept
for the entire social reality of these countries. The analysis of the social position of believers
as second-class citizens in Yugoslavia could turn out to be instructive also for others and
permits a certain generalization of the results of such an in vestigation.
I
For our analysis it is of crucial importance first to identify these key characteristics
which are in the closest correspondence with the predominant doctrinal ideology, namely that
it is possible to change the global system as a natural system by "revolutionary" means into

a socialist society. 1

Such changes are decided upon and implemented by the Communist

Party, which alone knows the goals of social construction.
The first characteristic is, accordingly, a one party system, which alone permits the
efficacious realization of the elaborated social construction. A multi-party system in principle
is not possible.

The Communist Party becomes normatively assigned (by means of

constitutional or other legal texts) as an avant garde social elite, which has the right to
determine the direction of social development in all social spheres in accordance with the
values and criteria of their own aims regardless of the will and attitude of the citizens. The
radical conclusion is that political democracy, as an universal achievement of human
civilization, is viewed as an anti-systemic structure.
The second characteristic is reflected in a completely closed systemic social model.
Effective directing of social development is possible only by denial of freedom of all
individual behavior which does not coincide with the specified conception of the social
project. In the contrary case, the permission of innovative attempts of individuals or social
groups would permanently threaten the Party's social project and therefore their realization
is thwarted or even completely prevented.

Therefore civil and human rights in these
countries are in principle unacceptable because they are against the system. 2
The third characteristic deals with the logic of the structure of the project and the model
of leadership of social development. The model of leadership is strictly hierarchical. That
means, firstly, that the general principles of the project without exception determine the
positions and solutions on the lower levels. The individual and particular must function
strictly as part of the general; that is axiomatic and without discussion. Out of it follows that
centralization is the essential part of the social construct.3 All the initiatives, ideas, and
general solutions always stem from the "center" and are transmitted by middle, lower, and
lowest levels of hierarchic structures, namely, from top to bottom. Every other way,
primarily from the bottom to the top, is regarded as explicitly anti-systemic and is therefore
consistently repressed.

1Every serious analysis of programmatic (constitutional and party) document in Eastern European

countries quickly supports this hypothesis. See, for example, the Yugoslav Constitution of 1974.

2 For numerous reasons socialist countries cannot pub l icly declare these views and therefore the
constitutions of these countries (even the Stalinist Constitution of 1936) list and include all the
essential components of the declarations and conv.e ntions on human rights. However, their practice
is_impossible. Such inclusions of human and civil rights function exclusively to create the appearance
of legitimation of political power.

'
the organization of state power contains is a declaration of local self)governance,
regional autonomy or similar, in reality they do not function, but serve to legitimate political power.
3Although

2

The fourth determinant relates to the character and meaning of the state and the
government. The state, as a means by which the Communist Party uses for the realization
of its p roject, in principle cannot be the so called state of laws, in the classic meaning of that
_
term. The socialist state is perceived as the "absolute" rule which is not bound by any norms
of"Jaws which would precede public laws, e.g. natural human rights or private, special rights
as the source of legal norms and human rights. The only original source of legal norms is
public law. Practically this means that all social structures and activities are clearly legally
regulated with the application of the principle that everything is forbidden unless explicitly
allowed. That also means that there is a need for an enormous administrative apparatus not
only for the carrying out of that which is legally stipulated, but also for the control and
repression of everything that appears outside the legally regulated and not only for the
repression of everything which is against the norms. The state takes on the function of
defending the Party's project but not the function of defending civil and human rights.
The fifth characteristic is that in these societies the natural activity of the market system
is replaced by measures of the Communist Party and the state. That means the absolute
predominance of the administrative regulation and activity even in the economy. Planned
economy is the slogan of that model. According to the above mentioned principle, even the
economy functions according to the hierarchical form of administration. An independent,
autonomous economic enterprise is impossible in principle because it is an anti-systemic
entity. Also impossible is private ownership, or so called pluralism in the form of ownership.
Likewise impossible is the actual functioning of social ownership or self-management
regardless of its basic socially progressive significance. Basically only state ownership with
all its consequences is acceptable. This means that ownership is in the hands of political
rulers. Since the administering of this state ownership cannot be done directly and absolutely,
the political rulers (depending explicitly or implicitly from the conditions in different
socialist countries) distribute ownership rights to individual producers and thereby create
not only the appearance but also the real relationships characteristic for feudal forms of
property ownership. Looking at it radically that means that ownership in these countries is
privately owned by the state, but that all rights which are derived from it are in the hands
of the political power-holders, who distribute these powers arbitrarily. And since the holder
of the power is the Communist Party that means that the party controls absolutely all
processes and channels of use of these distributed rights. 4 At least for now one cannot deny

4Because of that in my country of Yugoslavia it was not possible to accomplish the great
projected economic and social reform which was launched in 1950 under the name
self
management. One should say, that this project, despite the failure of its implementation remains
theoretically and humanistically very interesting and still opens the possibility of the realization of
great human hopes of a socially just society.
3

that in various socialist socicics there are other characteristics or parallel sub-systems of
private and cooperative ownersh ip, but only as minor phenomena.
The sixth characteristic is the {im)possi bility of articulating various individual and group
interests or even showing initiative in all spheres of societal life, from culture to politics and
econom ics. Such natural articulation is in principle anti-systemic at least in so far as the
interests and initiatives collide with the vision and articulation of the projected development
by the leading Communist political elite.5 Due to this it is impossible to have autonomous
associations and organizations even in the economy, and even less in politics or elsewhere.
Every form of associations of interests is prescribed "from above" or allowed only on the
basis of prior permission of the hierarchically determined political (party) governing organ.
Consequently self-management, in the sense of activity independent of the center of the
system, is, as stated previously, not acceptable in principle for the said system. Since in all
those countries (especially in Yugoslavia) there are forms of associating and acting which are
called self-management, one should state that these are limited forms of self-management,
forms which we might call para-self-management. They should not be underestimated but
it is important to see their limits. These limits are determined by the normative system of
government which in principle allow the center of political power to intervene arbitrarily and
freely either into the functioning of individual politico-territorial units (republic, commune,
county, autonomous region, or similar), individual economic enterprises, or normatively
determined "self-managed" associations. More specifically: it is not only a case of para
self-managing but of pseudo-se lf-managing. The form of arbitration from the center varies
from country to country.

In those cases where there is a full identity between the

government and the party leadership the arbitrating of the party is exploitative. If there is
a declared separation of the government and party organization, the party arbitration is
implicit, but no less effective.

Hence, all

attempts by political-territorial units

(communities) to function autonomously are regarded anti-systemic.

A radical conflict

situation therefore emerges especially in the case of republics and (formally) autonomous
regions in which there is a close identity between the political and ethnic (national)
commun ity. 6
The seventh characteristic deals with the axiomatic claim that the project of the
Communist Party is scientific with an a priori assertion that Marxism is a science. The result

5 Here I need to call to attention the necessity of distinguishing between the Communist Party
in its entirety and the leading political elite. Namely, due to the same systemic reasons even party
members are denied every possibility of free initiative, which would collide with the project of the
leadership. The notion of dissident is most closely related with this situation.
6
Current conflicts between nationalities and ethnic groups in the U.S.S.R., Yugoslavia, and
Romania, and to a lesser degree in Czechoslovakia can be analyzed in this context.
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is a slogan about scientific socialism, a scientific worldview (Weltanschauung), a scientific
school, etc. The Communist Party is represented not merely as avant garde, a leading social
subject, but also as the carrier, "owner" of an avant gardist scientific ideology, which
provides, without exception, scientific solutions for all spheres of social life. The existence
of other ideologies (and religions) may, at best, be tolerated.

Competitive, alternative

functioning of other ideologies is regarded as anti-systemic. Every form of competitiveness
disturbs the system thus conceived. Therefore special defense mechanisms are created under
the guidance of the political center. The final radical consequence of the defense mechanism
is that it develops into a mechanism of repression (Party and state) whose goal is to destroy
or at least marginalize the alternative ideologies. Historical evidence points to the conclusion
that the final variant is when Marxism becomes an explicitly fundamentalist para-religion,
which shows signs of aggression and destruction of other patterns of thought and behavior
of people, both individuals and groups.
Based on the above listed characteristics of real Socialist societies (formulated as ideal
types in Weber's meaning of the term) we can determine the essential characteristics of the
social position of (religious) believers within these societies. Not taking into account, for the
time being, the rich and manifold historical and sociological evidence which testifies to the
events in the field of religion of Eastern European socialist countries (including Yugoslavia),
but paying attention exclusively to the character of these societies, we can list the some of
the essential characteristics of this process.

I.

At best, the system tolerates the existence of various religious groups, religious

organizations and communities.

For a variety of reasons the decision is not to prohibit

completely their formal existence and activity (except in Albania). However, a whole series
of legal mechanisms for the

limitation of their activities with the goal of social

marginalization of religious organizations was established. The ideologically primary concept
of the freedom of religious activity actually limits that freedom to liturgical activity within
church buildings. The single party system, which was established after the revolution, cannot
accept any organization, especially political, which is not under its direct control or is
explicitly permitted by it. Large churches especially (i.e. Catholic, Orthodox, and Protestant)
are not only institutions outside the system, but represent a great challenge to the system due
to their very existence.

Such ch urches are, namely, not some small, insignificant oases

outside the system, but represent a significant and influential segment of society, which the
system is unable to control directly and cannot exert an influence upon its internal structure,
and even less so upon the church's teaching. For the system the Catholic Church is a special
challenge due to worldwide (international) character with a hierarchical center outside the
country, which they cannot influence. The existence of such large churches within socialist
countries, according to the fundamentalist interpretation of Marxism, corresponds to an
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unfinished revolution. Therefore there are numerous actions (reactions) of the system with
the goal of carrying· out the revolution as originally conceived. Sociological and historical
evidence about various persecutions and even massacres (pogroms) testifies about these
attempts to finish the revolution.
2. The avant garde political party, which insists on the absolute monopoly of social
decision-making, starting with the assumption of power, and even more so later, needs the
justification of its own fa ilures. Therefore churches can serve as a welcome scapegoat who
is blamed for failures in the "building of socialism." Failures might threaten the monopoly
of the avant garde in the eyes of the population. Therefore the system. must construe a
subject of responsibility outside itself. Such a function is taken over by "the class enemy."
Although it is desirable that such an enemy, in principle, be basicly imaginary and
undetermined (therefore slogans such as nationalism, technocracy, bureaucracy, liberalism,
etatism, dogmatism, anarchism,

anticommunism,

antisocialism,

contrarevolution--all

functioning as the "class enemy") yet, in various phases of the so called struggle against the
"class enemy" the. system ascribes responsibility for its own failures also to the churches.
That leads to new repressions and new limitations for religious organizations and institutions.
3. Slogans produced by the system, as well as ideological fantasies about the "danger of
clericalism or cleronationalism." especially in the case of Yugoslavia, play a special role.
Looking at it objectively, one detects the most sensitive spot of the system about the
competit iveness in the political sphere of society. Simple monopoly does not only include the
monopoly of a political ideology which creates and achieves things "from. top �o bottom,"
from the political center downward, but excludes generally every political initiative "from
bottom up" and within the system, if this initiative is against the ruling political values and
solutions. Even more so it excludes every political initiative of political subjects outside the
system. Every political initiative, even in the form of moral attitudes expressed toward
specific social and political events, which might come from religious groups or organizations,
especially from churches, are · in principle anti-systemic.

Therefore they are repressed.

Exceptions are possible due to tactical political reasons only w�en religious groups or
individuals give supportive statement about the existing political and social system. In its
function of legitimizing the existing system such exceptions may even be accorded the status
of the permitted. 7 The charge of clericalism (or the abuse of belief and the church for
political purposes) is applied to every instance of articulating a critical moral-political
reflection upon social reality by the believers and especially by church leaders. J:he charge

7Paradigmatic cases of this kind are the well known and by the system supported patriotic clergy
associations in all socialist countries.
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of cleronationalism as a stigma ·is applied in principle to every attempt of public
pronouncement by the church about the relationship between religion and the nation.
4.

Citizens-believers, members of religious communities, may, according to the

announcement of the system, if they have political aspirations, involve themselves only in
existing socio-political organizations which have been recognized by the system. This is true
both for organizations in the narrower sense of the word, as well as for other nonpolitical or
prepolitical associations and societies. The network of socio-political organizations,
associatipns and societies is prescribed from the center and allows no exceptions,
spontaneities or initiatives from "bottom up."

.
Even in this respect there are two limitations for citizens-believers. The first is in regard

to the possible ways of their participation in political and social life. The system does not
tolerate, much less permit, any explicit appeal to religious values for such participation. The
believer can function only as an abstract citizen and must, in accord with the system's
principle that belief is only a separate personal concern, leave her, or his religious convictions
"at home." The second, even more essential limitation, has to do with the absolute party
monopoly. Accordingly, the entire network of socio-political organizations, associations, and
societies functions exclusively as a transmission mechanism of the Communist Party. The
programs of these organizations sometimes even explicitly state that they are identical with
the Party program. Since the Party program normally values religion negatively, aiming at
its "dying out," believers find themselves in a situation of acting against their own
convictions, aspirations, and interests.
5. The status of believers as second-class citizens is the direct result of the avant garde

societal role of the Communist Party.

Explicitly or implicitly all Communist Parties of

Eastern Europe accept the Bolshevik concept about religion as an obstacle for the full
participation of believers in activities aiming at changing social relations. Therefore believers
are not allowed to join the Communist Party, which is a privileged political institution. This
is reflected not only in the fact that there are few believers who are party members, but also
that, practically speaking, they are absent from the organs of government, centers and places
where the greatest amount of political and social power is concentrated. The system gives
preference in such roles and places to members of the Communist Party. Therefore, as a
norm, believers are excluded from governing institutions. There is a negligible chance that
they may succeed to be involved in leadership positions of any social sphere (from economic
and political to cultural and educational). Some analysts even regard believers are third
class citizens, because second-class citizenship is accorded to all nonmembers of the
Communist Party, among whom are also nonbelievers. From the perspective of the system
public expression of religious convictions are a sufficient reason for sharper attacks upon
religious than irreligious non-Party members. Social, professional, and political promotion
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of citizens-believers is therefore not only systematically made impossible or obstructed by
the system but is declared as anti-systemic because it would cause problems with the political
monopoly of Communist Party members.
6.

The ideological slogan of the scientific worldview, which seeks the systematic

acceptance of this view, namely the homogenization of the worldview conception, specially
harms the believers.

The religious worldview is regarded by the system as a specially

dangerous obstacle in the elimination of nonscientific worldviews. The concept of scientific
worldview is claimed to be identical with Marxism, which in principle included atheism,
formulated as militant atheism. The religious worldview is seen as being theistic, hence in
complete contradiction with the Marxist. On that basis in all socialist countries, a more or
less strictly i nstitutionali zed system reeducates citizens in the aim of homogenizing their
world view. This was especially manifested in the school system either 1n the form of explicit
or implicit obligatory study of so called scientific atheism. One must not underestimate the
importance of the separate system of atheist propaganda from atheist museums and exhibits
to publishing activities. All of that had many psychological effects upon the spiritual world
of the believing population. They were constantly exposed to pressure, which caused mass
traumatization of believers as they were convinced, with good reason, that

even in

contemporary socialism, and more so in the future, their convictions are undesirable.
From all the above on the basis of the analysis of the system, we can conclude that the
interpretative hypothesis of the second-class position of believers under conditions of real
socialist societies is warranted. Second-class citizenship is a sociological metaphor for the
social position of all those citizens, individuals and groups, whose models of thought and
behavior do not

fit into the system of prescribed and by the political and ideological

monolith desired forms of thinking and behaving. Conflict between required behavior and
the natural behavior of citizens as human beings as a rule ends with negative consequences
for the social position of all who are "disobediept" and "insubordinate".

Historical and

sociological evidence testifies about various forms of such consequences in those countries
ranging from the complete marginalization in society to the revocation of citizenship and
exile. Believers experience this in a special manner also, because, as a rule, when compared
with others, they are also members of religious organizations and churches. Second-class
citizenship does not manifest itself merely in the form of personal experience, repression,
and unpleasantries, but also in collection problems and the factual exclusion from the system.
The forms of repression and exclusion from the system differ from country to country.
Each one them, from the U.S.S.R. to Yugoslavia, have their peculiarities. But none of the
specificities of Eastern European countries leads to the loss of the common characteristics
which we described.
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Already at this point in our analysis we must assert that the model of real socialism never
functioned perfectly nor optimally in any of these countries in the course of various time
periods. What is obvious is that in this moment the social reality of real socialist countries
is experiencing a serious, all-encompassing structural and comprehensive social crisis of the
"second wave." Out of that crisis came many initiatives of new (and old) political elites in
order to reform the system. Glasnost, perestroika, "new thinking," rights of people, new
socialism, socialism with a human face are only some of the slogans which connote change,
new possibilities, and even new horizons not only for socialist countries but for all of
humanity.

It is clear that the single party system of rule is not an exemplary form of

governing highly developed societies.

The single party system, as we already noticed,

presupposes undeveloped human structures, hierarchical and bureaucratic rule and thereby
establishes only a single center of organization which has all the "truth."

Feedback of

information, which is needed by every system, has the sole function in real socialism to exert
control about how exactly and faithfully lower levels execute directives and decrees sent
from above. Looking at this system sociologically this model contains the largest number
of instances of the enlightenment absolutist state with pronounced feudal components. The
crisis had to take place also because the system is totally unable to adapt itself and respond
to the demands of the contemporary age which were raised by the structures of the post
industrial information society. All socialist societies are latently or even manifestly facing a
crystal clear . alternative:

remain within the framework of the prevalent real socialist

conception or look for solutions, reforms, and corrections within the system or even reject
that concept and construct a model of a natural system, which would in essence mean to
construct a social-democratic model, as it functions in some European countries. According
to the first alternative the reforms would in the final instance mean still greater
centralization, administrative arbitrariness in all social relations, an even greater degree of
economic, political, cultural, and spiritual homogenization and more efficient control from
top to bottom. In the latter case a social-democratization of the entire system would occur
with positive consequences in economics, politics, and culture as well as in the field of
human rights. The fate of the so called religious question depends on whether the first or
the second option will be implemented. At the present there are still open possibilities for
the implementation of either option. Therefore it is still useful to reflect about the second
class status of religious believers as citizens in these countries.
II
At the time of this writing [April 1 989] Yugoslavia is facing a deep, all-encompassing
social crisis, the likes of which was not seen since 1945.

9

Today it is clear, that despite

attempts in the past to distance the country from the model of real socialism, this has not
occurred. Several very opportune occasions to achieve this goal were missed.
The first opportunity was immediately in 1945, after the War and after the completely
autochthonous movement for national liberation, which already during World War II came
into conflict with Stalinist Bolshevism. Despite efforts for other alternatives, the victorious
Communist elite accepted the Stalinist Bolshevik model of social organization in its entirety.
The second opportunity came in 1 948 after the brutal conflict betweenStalin and Tito,
when society had to find a new identity in order to be d�stinguishable from the Stalinist
model.

The massive support which the population gave to Tito opened incredible

opportunities for a change. However, the case of Milovan Djilas in 1953 testifies that the
political elite did not wish to abandon the concept of political, cultural, and economic
monolithism. Renewed serious attempts were related to the program of economic and social
reform in 1956 which did not succeed for the same reasons and terminated in the "icy" 1970s
(as sociologists called it) which led to the new homogenization of all social sectors supported
by significant repressions. The second half of 1980s (after Tito's death in 1980) show signs
of even deepe r social crises which may resolve themselves in either of the two directions
described earlier.
The first real efforts to transcend the real socialist model in Yugoslavia can be
undoubtedly identified in the second half of the I 960s in the form of the fairly important
movement toward dialogue between Marxists and Christians.

The significance of that

movement, whose protagonists are intellectuals from both sides, especially in parts of
Yugoslavia in which the Catholic Church is predominant (Slovenia and Croatia), is .that the
concept .in itself presupposes equality of all who participate in the dialogue, including the
equality of Christians. The public manifestations of this movement brought a lot of fresh
ideas in the cultural and spiritual sphere although politicians were at best tolerant but
simultaneously kept "closing" the intellectual space. However, one should not underestimate
the impact of this movement for the softening of political attitudes toward religious
organizations and a certain liberalization in regard to the exercise of all human rights by
believers.

"The ice years" essentially suspended the dialogue or at least completely

marginalized it. The political center was skillfully able to manipulate the religious pluralism
of Yugoslavia with which there are permanently connected latent or manifest tensions and
oppos ition between the three great religions of Yugoslavia, namely Catholicism, Orthodoxy,
and Islam.
The second, more serious attempt of public reflection of religious freedoms and related
social position of believers was the publication of the results of empirical research of
sociologists of religion about religious phenomena in various parts of the country, and
especially in Slovenia, Croatia (Zagreb, Split) and Serbia (Belgrade, Nis, Novi Sad). The
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empirically oriented sociology of religion definitely destroyed the monopoly of ideology and
politics in this field. By means of its activity it "legalized" religious views, convictions, and
practice.

The publication of the results of the empirical research greatly demystified

ideological positions about the marginalization of religious convictions and the influence of
religious communities.

Though it may sound anachronistic, by means of this research

religious phenomena received the dignity of an object of scientific research and lost to a
large degree the status of an object of obligatory ideological manipulation.
Nevertheless the publishing of the results of empirical research, which deal directly with
the question of the political and social equality of believers as citizens, during their
publication in 1 986 encountered a severe political and ideological reaction even in Slovenia,
the westernmost part of the country which has the reputation of having a liberal political
elite. This was less in regard to the reliability of the data (numbers) but more in regard to
our efforts to interpret the empirical data, although the interpretation was in the form of
interpretative hypotheses in so far as we attempted to relate the existing situation to the
system, either by defining the system's defects or by pointing to the logic of the system's
production.
During the annual polling of public opinion in the republic of Slovenia- -an independent
federal unit of Yugoslavia- -in the 1 980s we have already thrice polled a representative
sample of the population and among the others also asked the following question:8
Do you think that the believing (religious) citizens. are · in any manner neglected
(abused), are in an unequal position or not?
In the annual poll we received the following distribution: of replies to this question:
1 983

1 984

1 986

-no,they are not being neglected
in any respect

65.7%

6 1 .6%

6 1 .7%

20.3%

25.4%

22.9%

-in principle and by the
constitution they are not, but
in practice it does occur

8Slovenia is one of the six republics and two autonomous regions which make up Yugoslavia.
It is Yugoslavia's western- most part bordering Italy. Austria, and Hungary. Nationally it is
homogeneous, because the Slovene people represent nearly 1 00% of the population of the republic.
The Catholic religion is absolutely predominant. According to research in 1 988 58% of the population
(over 1 8 years old) declared itself religious. The research of public opinion is being carried out by
the scientific institute of he School of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism of the University
in Ljubljana. The sample is representative (21 00 questioned). The population is about 2 million,
which represents 8% of Yugoslavia's population.
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-Y§,

in principle they are being

neglected
-I do not know, undecided

3 .0%

2.7%

4. 1 %

1 1 .0%

1 0.3%

1 1 .3%

Parallel with these data we had the use of research data regarding views and values of
high school youth in Slovenia ( I 980, 1 98 1 , and 1 986) in which the diversity of positions was
even more accentuated.

As much as 45% ( 1 980), 44% ( 1 9 8 1 ) and 48.8% (1986) opined that
in practice believers are being neglected. 9
The interpretation of the cited empirical data started with the presupposition that the
declared statements about human and citizens liberties in the Constitution of Yugoslavia are
not problematic, because these definitions were taken over from the generally accepted
international conventions and declarations. Further they started with the presupposition that
perceptions of the restrictions of these liberties (in our case the political and other freedoms
of believing citizens) depend upon many socio-demographic, statutory, and other factors.
Also taken into account was that less than the entire population is religious. Namely the
sociological evidence in these years when research was done, was that 50-53% of the entire
'

'

grownup (over 1 8 years of age) population is religious. That means that we had to take into
consideration that the sensibility of believers in that respect is probably different from the
sensibility of nonbelievers. Additional material for our interpretation was also the written
replies of the high school students ( 1 980, 1 98 1 ) who could (and mostly did) document their
answers with examples from life, which led to the conclusion that citizens who are believers
are in practice neglected. That led us to look for an answer why the high school students
( 1 4- 1 8 years old) perceived a greater neglect of believers than did adults. From the above
as well as the broader referential framework resulting from the real socialist reality, we
believe that the fact that every fourth respondent points to the violation of civil rights of
bel ievers cannot be interpreted as accidental or as a ;'natural phenomenon" which appears
only in the model but not in real life� The density of "cases" is so great that at least it points
to defects in the system. This system includes social, legal, or psychological mechanisms

9Research of the views of high school students in 1 986 in Slovenia (representative sample) was
carried out by the scientific institute of the School of Sociology, Political Science, and Journalism
of the University of Ljubljana within an international project of European youth and peace, which
was launched by the School of Pedagogical Sciences (UPS) in Rome, Italy..Research in 1 980 and
1 98 1 was also carried out by the Ljubljana institute. The question about the equality of believers
was formulated identically.
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which block or at least limit the opportunities for believers in their attempts to exercise the
declared human and civil rights.
A paradigmatic example of these mechanisms is the operation of so called moral-political
fitness.

Until recently all public job opening announcements, especially for leadership

positions, included also the request that the candidate demonstrate moral and political fitness
for the job. In practice it is clear that this always indicates the selection of a member of the
Communist Party. Factually believers were obstructed in their "regular" professional
promotion. This was even more accentuated in political promotion. How else to explain the
fact that there are no believers in the highest levels of federal, republican, and even local
governments? While in the lowest institutions of self-management (local communities) one
can still find here and there a believer

as

a president or secretary, this does not happen at the

level of the county, region , republic, or federation.
The system of real socialism produces suspicion of nonparty members, especially
believers. The system of so called "cadre coordination" (formally within the framework of
the Socialist A lliance of the Working People) places control mechanisms at all levels of the
system, which, without exception, gives preference in political elections to members of the
Communist Party and others who are "morally and politically fit."

A special system of

selecting "cadres" function also for professional service in the army and police. Empirical
investigations of (non)religiosity in the republic of Croatia, for instance, show that people
in those services are mostly members of the Communist Party. A similar system of selection,
though not so rigid and explicit can be found in the field of education, especially in middle
and higher schools and in the state administration of the republican or federal levels.
Moral-political fitness was practically until yesterday the criterium for selecting and
retaining university professors. A special impact in that respect was the decree in the statute
and program of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia that nonreligiosity is a condition of
membership. This is then connected to the constitutional provision about the leading role of
the Communist Party in society. This means that the party is legally privileged and so are
its members when compared to other citizens and especially believers.
Church hierarchies of both the Catholic and the Orthodox churches frequently pointed
out these facts both as the base and the cause of the second-class citizenship of believers.
The importance of these empirical data consists also in pointing out that the perception of
the "inequality of believers in practice" is present not only among believers but also among
nonbelievers or undecided. The distribution of this perception among believers is above the
Slovene average ( 1 983: 26. 7%, 1 984: 33.2%, 1 986: 33.9%). That is understandable on account
of their greater sensibilities. The distribution of this perception among nonbelievers, as one
may expect, is under the Slovene average ( 1 983: 1 7.8%, 1 984: 20.3%, 1 986: 1 7.8%). However,
nearly every fifth citizen nonbeliever confirms the discrimination of believers. The same
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trend one can see in the distribution among (non)religious high school students in Slovenia.
Among high school students who attend catechism classes (research of 1 986) the view that
believers are discriminated against is as high as 7 1 %.
How to interpret the greater degree of criticism among the youth? Why is the sensibility
of h i gh school believers greater than among adult believers? The social structure of adult
believers certainly affects the distribution of their views. In 1 986 the believing population
was made of 7 1 .8% of qualified laborers, farmers, retirees, and homemakers, 1 9.8% were
white collar workers, and the rest made up 8.3%.

This social composition of believers

determines the lower level of perception about their social position as citizens-believers as
does the larger distance between them and those social segments which due to discrimination
on account of religious conviction they are practically absent (politics, eduction, army,
police, publ ic admin istration, and organs of government). High school students, on the other
hand, experience discrimination more directly on account of their experience of the
promotion of the scientific (Marxist) worldview.

The young are less conformists by
I

definition and their experience tends to be more emotional than that of adults.
These hypotheses are supported by the documentation of the statements by the youth as
to where and how discrimination against believers is taking place, which they made during
the poll ing. The majority of statements point to discrimination in:
schools (singling out believers, discrimination against teachers who are believers,
preferential treatment of atheism),
professional promotion (preferential treatment of Communists in job applications when
compared to believers, stipends and financial assistance for education, discrimination against
believers for the teaching positions),
political advancement (there are no believers in any significant political institutions, the
excl us ion of believers from pol itics due to moral-political fitness criteria),
suspicion by the general public toward religion and believers (here they mention critical
and derisive articles about religion in the press, ridicule by political leaders, identification
of religion with superstition, trickery, and fallacy, and t he general negative atmosphere in
regard to religion in all of society),
privileged social position of Communists (Communists have a priori greater rights in their
jobs, politics and elsewhere; in all leading positions one finds only Communists),
bel ievers cannot be members of the Communist Party (that means they cannot be in
certain professions such as police, customs, army, and this also means the prohibition for
Communists to belong to the church which directly intervenes into human and familial
relations),
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the abuse of clergy (the position of clergy is discriminated against, the press and other
media attack clergy, students of theology are not treated equally with other students by
government organs),
radio and television (inability of clergy to appear on their programs, religious events are
not considered newsworthy, no worship services are broadcast),
army (religion and believers are treated differently, i.e. negatively in the spirit of
scientific and militant atheism).
These are the main social sectors and manners which high school students identify as
areas in which there is abuse of religion and believers. They form the basis of the perception
of the inequality of believers.
The ideological and political reaction was sharp and negative in respect to our
interpretation that all empirical evidence points to the conclusion that a large number of
believers as well as other citizens experience the socialist system as discriminatory
mechanisms against believers and who experience their social position as being second-class
citizens.

Using the old neo-stalinist approach they stressed that this was a misuse of

scholarly and professional research for "antagonistic purposes," which supposedly happens
whenever the socialist system is in difficulty and crisis. The Constitutional provisions about
the equality all citizens before the law regardless of worldview and religion are supposedly
the best proof about the untruthfulness and unacceptability of the thesis of second-class
citizenship of believers. Since the authors of these ideological and political writings were
unable to completely negate some of the well-known negative instances, they explained the
abuse of believers with the well-known Bolshevik slogan about "sectarianism."

Some

Communists, supposedly, do not understand correctly the social approach to believers and
make mistakes in their actions. They are usually provoked by clerical activities, especially by
clergy, who tend to abuse belief and church for political purposes. Any other interpretation,
therefore, means a reactionary, even contra-revolutionary attack upon all the foundations of
the socialist system. And so forth.
Despite all of this sociological science, based on empirical data and analysis of the whole
system remains firm in its interpretational hypothesis about the second-class citizenship of
believers. We were also convinced by data obtained from the research of public opinion in
Slovenia in 1 987, when we tested again the question of the social inequality of believers. The
percentage of those who believe that there is no inequality in the constitution and the laws
but that in practice there is such inequality increased from 22.9% in 1 986 to 33.00% with an
additional 3.8% who believe there is general inequality. The percentage of those who state
that there is no inequality in theory or practice fell from 6 1 .7% in 1 986 to 52.9%. Knowing
the situation in our country we cannot interpret this as meaning there is an increase of
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believers. More plausible is the interpretative hypothesis that especially since 1 986 there is
increased awareness by citizens, including believers, about their human and civil rights.
In the recent years (especially since 1 987) there came a change in Yugoslavia, along with
the escalation of the social crisis. These changes are symbolized by three slogans by which
the political elite announces its willingness to change: economic reform, the reform of the
political system, and the reform of the Communist Party.

In the field of politics a

reaffirmation of political pluralism occurred. In regard to the reform of the Communist
Party there is not only a greater demand of separating the Communist Party from the
government but also for the elimination of the constitutional provision of its privileged and
leading role.

The essential qualitative novelty is that there is also a strongly articulated

pressure for change from the bottom, and at least in certain parts of the country (this is
especially true for Slovenia) there are also at the top political elites which are very liberally
oriented and to whom change does not mean only a political tactic out of necessity but also
a new political strategy under the slogan "new socialism." I h th � t context there emerged a
more relaxed climate also in regard to the religious question;
The social and political scene is still completely open; all options and attempts to deal
,
with the crisis are possible. The fate of the question of the second-class citizenship of
believers will depend upon the option taken.
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